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Abstract  
Real life is a bigger game in which what a player does early on can affect what others choose to do 
later on. In particular we can strive to explain how cooperative behaviour can be established as a result of 
rational behaviour. When engaged in a repeated situation, players must consider not only their short-term 
gains but also their long-term payoffs. The general idea of repeated games is that players may be able to 
deter another player from exploiting his short-term advantage by threatening a punishment that reduces 
his long-term payoff. The aim of the paper that supports this abstract is to present and discuss dynamic 
game theory. There are three basic kinds of reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, to study what 
happens in repeated games. First, it provides a pleasant and a very interesting theory and it has the 
advantage of making us become more humble in our predictions. Second, many of the most interesting 
economic interactions repeated often can incorporate phenomena which we believe are important but 
which are not captured when we restrict our attention to static games. Finally, economics, and 
equilibrium based theories more generally, do best when analysing routinized interactions. 
Keywords: Dynamic Games, Code Form Game, Repeated Game. 
JEL Classification: C73, C71, C46. 
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1 Introduction  
In a contentious atmosphere players, who are not always human or aware of what they are doing, 
compete in order to achieve their objectives. In a game each party's interests are confronted, which makes 
each player develop action strategies to maximize gains or minimize losses, i.e., the player is looking for 
a strategy which will result in reaching a certain objective in opposition with the other players who are 
also trying to optimize their position. The final outcome depends on the set of strategies taken up by all 
participants. That is, a game is any situation governed by rules with well-defined outcomes characterized 
by strategic interdependence. 
As we know game theory is a discipline which allows vast and interesting results to be achieved in 
classifying, formalizing and solving distinct interaction situations. For this reason it is often used to study 
competition in oligopolistic markets. Competition in this type of environment is characterized by 
strategic interdependence. 
It is starting from precisely this assumption that we present and analyse ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ 
game to demonstrate how starting with game theory we can model and establish results for situations 
which occur in economic theory. 
‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ has attracted the attention of researchers because it depicts a contradictory 
situation incisively: in looking for the best, each economic agent produces a non-optimum outcome from 
   
the stakeholders' point of view. In other words, this game demonstrates that under certain circumstances 
looking out for their personal interests leads economic agents to inefficient outcomes in the Pareto sense. 
Thus, a concerted action may lead all agents to more favourable outcomes. 
In a two-company cartel, both companies face an analogous situation. By cooperating they can 
obtain half of a monopoly’s profits, but if both have to decide independently on quantities or prices, then 
each company will consider it less favourable to cooperate regardless of the competitor's decision. So, in 
terms of self-interest, both companies compete to obtain lower profits than they would obtain through 
cooperation. In the context of a duopoly, this idea is validated by competitive variables in general, 
namely production quantities, defining prices, costs with advertising campaigns, research and 
development. 
Nevertheless, in a repeated interaction, the expectation of future encounters makes cooperating 
more attractive. The end of the interactions should not be known beforehand, i.e. there should be some 
probability of a next play. Company heads are often heard to say: ‘‘things change’’. Therein lays the 
challenge. If the business relationship between the various economic agents occurs only once, knowledge 
of what the other agent does is irrelevant. It does not matter what his strategy is; the best response is not 
to cooperate. If the relationship is to last, it is an entirely different matter. Each one's decision depends on 
the durability of the interaction. It also depends on decisions taken at earlier stages. It does not depend, 
however, on future actions and no company knows the line of reasoning of its competitor. That is, in a 
game where the result is not cooperative, cooperation may be a perfect Nash equilibrium of the game 
repeated infinitely. This happens in the ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’. Thus, we can expect companies to 
cooperate in a duopoly with an infinite horizon but theoretically not in the finite case. Even though a 
non-cooperative game repeated any finite number of times is still a non-cooperative game, reality shows 
that companies try often to implement ways to cooperate. 
 
2 ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ 
Let us now analyse the ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ game. This example of a non-cooperative game 
highlights the rationality required when two individuals meet in a position where the decision of one of 
them depends on the decision of the other one. 
 
Symmetrical Game with Two Players 
Two individuals, player 1 and player 2, who are supposedly criminals are arrested, see Straffin 
(1980). The problem for the police is that, assuming both are involved and in the absence of proof, a 
confession is required. Imprisoned in individual and distant cells without communication between them 
each one is given the rules in this case: 
 If no one chooses to confess, both will be accused of a lesser offence which will mean a symbolic 
sentence of only one month in jail. 
 If both confess, thereby assuming participation in the crime both will be condemned to a 4 year 
jail sentence.  
 Finally, if one confesses and the other one does not, the one who confesses will be released 
immediately, and the other will receive the maximum penalty under the law: 5 years in jail. 
The strategies in this case are: “confess” or “not confess”. The payoffs are the sentences. The 
following figure shows the game in code form, see Matos and Ferreira (2006) and Matos (2009). 
1 1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´PC´´ 0,5 
 
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 4,4 
 
1, ´´PC´´ 2, ´´PC´´ 1,1 
 
1, ´´PC´´ 2, ´´C´´ 5,0 
‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ code form 
   
 
Considering player 1, confessing – C, is better if player 2 stays quiet – PC, as he will be freed 
immediately for confessing. Confessing is better if player 2 confesses because prison is inevitable and he 
would, therefore, obtain benefits for having confessed. We may conclude then, by analysing player 2's 
choices, confessing is strictly better for player 1. Consequently confessing is, for him, a dominant 
strategy. If the same analysis is carried out for player 2, confessing is also a dominant strategy. Since 
each suspect only has one dominant strategy, confessing, the only result of the game for rational suspects 
is (C, C). 
Note that this analysis only requires that each player is rational and knows the agreement that is being 
offered by authorities, i.e. his possible payoffs. A suspect does not need to know what the other suspect 
has been promised nor whether or not the other suspect is rational. 
 
 ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ in Two Stages 
In a repeated game, players present a possibility of establishing a reputation for cooperating which 
will lead the other player to proceed in accordance. The entire strategy will depend on whether the game 
is repeated either a finite or an infinite number of times. That strategic interaction process allows a 
history to be built between players. Thus, this players' behaviours history is assessed so as to evaluate the 
convenience or not of following through on the game. Meanwhile, even though the player knows the 
decisions that were taken in previous stages, they may be asked to decide without prior knowledge of the 
other players' choices in that stage. Repeated games are a sample of how to induce cooperation, even 
when players show significant gains in the opposite behaviour by not cooperating at each stage. The 
condition for which repetition of a game leads to a valuable relationship between players concerns to 
credibility. This fact can be observed by analysing the ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ game repeated in two 
stages as presented in code form in the following figure. 
 
1 1 1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 
  
  
2 1 
  
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 2,2 
    
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´D´´ 6,1 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´C´´ 1,6 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´D´´ 5,5 
1 1 1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´D´´ 
  
  
2 1 
  
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 6,1 
    
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´D´´ 10,0 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´C´´ 5,5 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´D´´ 9,4 
1 1 1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´C´´ 
  
  
2 1 
  
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 1,6 
    
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´D´´ 5,5 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´C´´ 0,10 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´D´´ 4,9 
1 1 1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´D´´ 
  
  
2 1 
  
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´C´´ 5,5 
    
1, ´´C´´ 2, ´´D´´ 9,4 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´C´´ 4,9 
    
1, ´´D´´ 2, ´´D´´ 8,8 
 ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ in code form repeated in two stages 
 
   
Suppose that both players simultaneously decide on two occasions, after seeing the result of the 
first decision but before deciding the second time. Suppose also that the payoff of the complete game is 
the sum of payoffs of each stage (meaning there is no discount). In the previous section we saw that when 
the ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ game is played once there is only one equilibrium, in which each player 
confesses. Using the backward induction process, we can easily see that the only perfect equilibrium in 
‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ sub-games in two stages consists in both prisoners confessing in each sub-game. 
That is, in the two-stage ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemma’’ game the only game equilibrium in the second stage is 
independent of the result of the first stage. In each of the four final games, there is only one equilibrium 
and, considering that a perfect equilibrium in sub-games should contain equilibrium in each sub-game, 
and that is the equilibrium of the sub-game, each player confesses in each sub-game. We are led to the 
first stage of the game, where there is once again only one equilibrium (C, C). 
Each player makes his choice regarding the strategy to be used considering the consequences that 
this choice will have in playing out the game. Judging the previous game we can observe that there is no 
incentive for cooperating in the second phase as no future relationship will be established. Cooperation in 
the first phase will not lead to cooperation in the second phase. Lack of credibility keeps prisoners away 
from achieving a better result than the equilibrium of that stage. One prisoner's promise of not confessing 
in the second period, which is what would be missing in order to obtain higher payments, does not pass 
the credibility filter. 
Is a cooperative solution possible in a non-cooperative game? 
Are there ways to implement cooperation in lasting relationships? 
Let us answer these questions in the following section. 
 
The ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ in Infinite Stages 
A finite game seems rather unrealistic to understand strategic interactions. Hence, the study of 
infinitely repeated games is more realistic. Just as in the case of games that are repeated a finite number 
of times, the main problem of infinitely repeated games is that credible threats and promises may 
influence present behaviour. 
Let us consider the ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ repeated infinitely, see von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1967) and Jorgensen, Quincampoix and Vincente (2007). Suppose that for each stage t, results of the 
previous t-1 moves of the game were observed before stage t begins. Let us begin by redefining payoffs 
for this type of game. Payoff assessment in games that are repeated an infinite number of times present 
some difficulties. As we know a euro in one hundred years will not be worth what it is worth today. To 
overcome the time horizon, future payoffs will be discounted with respect to the present. Thus, 
considering a fixed discount rate of  < 1, the present value of the infinite succession of payoffs 
associated with each stage is 
 
π1+π 2+
2π3+=∑ 
t-1 πt, t ≥ 1 
 
Considering our example, suppose each player's discount factor is , and that each player's payoff 
in the repeated game is the current value of the player's payoff at each stage of the game.  
In the ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ base game each player must choose his dominant strategy, which is 
“to confess”. Even when the game is repeated finitely, because each stage of the game has a single 
perfect Nash equilibrium, the only perfect equilibrium in sub-games is reached when both players choose 
to confess in each period. Nevertheless, when players are patient enough, we may maintain cooperation, 
keeping quiet, in each sub-game of each stage is a perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. 
We begin by seeing that that cooperation is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game and later that 
cooperation is a perfect equilibrium in sub-games. 
When an infinitely repeated game is played, each player i has a strategy for the repeated game, si , 
that is a sequence of the history depending on the strategies of the games stage si
t
, that is si =(si
0
,si
1). 
   
The n elements sequence of individual strategies of the repeated game is the strategic profile of the 
repeated game s, that is, s= (si, ,sn). 
The strategies of the repeated game, which are sufficient to lead to cooperation, are of the 
following form: Player i begin the infinitely repeated game by cooperating and keeps cooperating in each 
game of the following stage only if the players cooperate in each of the previous periods. In this ‘‘trigger 
strategy’’, player i cooperates until the other player stops cooperating, a situation which implies non-
cooperation in the whole future moves. Nevertheless, if both players adopt this strategy, the result of the 
infinitely repeated game will be (PC, PC). 
 
More precisely and formally, the player i's strategy in the repeated game is written,  si =(si
0
,si
1), 
as sequence of the story depending on the strategies of the game stage such that at period t and after 
history h
t
,  
  
       
                      
      
  
 
Note that history h
t
 is a sequence of the action profiles in each game stage that were played in t 
periods 0,1,2, t-1. ((PC, PC)t) is only a way of writing ((PC,PC),(PC,PC), ...,(PC,PC)), where 
(PC,PC) is repeated t times. We can simplify the previous system so as to be useful to our later analysis: 
h
0
 is the null history, we adopted the convention that profile h
0
 is played 0 times. Thus, t=0 implies that 
h
t
= ((PC, PC) 
t
). Therefore 
  
       
               
      
  
 
Let us prove, then, that for sufficiently patient players, the strategic profile           is a Nash 
equilibrium of the repeated game. 
In t=1, the history is h
1
=(PC,PC), such that both keep quiet. Consequently, at t=2, the history is 
h
2
=((PC,PC),(PC,PC)), so both stay quiet, and so on . So, the path associated with s is the infinite 
sequence of strategic profiles of cooperative actions ((PC,PC),(PC,PC). The payoff of the repeated 
game for each player which corresponds to this path is trivial: the payoff at each future stage will be 1. 
Can player j win if he deviates from strategy    of the repeated game on condition that player i 
follows    faithfully? Let t be the period in which player j deviates from that strategy for the first time. 
Given that player i will confess forever after period t, the best response for player j is effectively to 
confess whenever the outcome of a stage is different from (PC,PC). If player j chooses to confess at this 
period he will receive a payoff of 5. This deviation on the part of player j implies player i's non-
cooperation in any future move. This way the payoff at each future stage would be 1. Because     
       
 
   
 , the present value of this payoff sequence is                
 
   
. 
Alternatively, staying quiet would provide a payoff of 4 at this stage and will lead exactly to the 
same choice between confessing or staying quiet in the following stage. Let V be the present value of the 
infinite succession of payoffs player j will receive for making this choice in an optimum way. If player j 
chooses to stay quiet it is optimum and therefore   
 
   
 since staying quite leads to the same decision 
in the following period. If player j choosing to confess is optimum, then     
 
   
 as we have seen 
before. Thus, remaining quiet will be optimum if and only if   
 
   
   
 
   
    
 
 
 . 
Thus, as long as players are patient enough, cooperating is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game 
as long as   
 
 
. 
The following section presents a real-life example of a repeated ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ in which 
the above concepts are demonstrated. 
 
   
3 Price Leadership in the Breakfast Cereal Industry 
Companies which have competed daily for a century approximate the case of infinite repetitions. 
Each time the economic bases change the possibility of benefiting and the set of the equilibriums of the 
game repeated an infinite number of times also changes. The problem of coordinating an infinite number 
of equilibriums becomes extremely complex. Let us see how the breakfast cereal industry has adapted to 
the challenge brought about by the infinite repetition of the game – see Gardner (1996).  
Breakfast cereals were invented in the United States in 1890 by advocates for a healthy diet. Two 
of the inventors, Kellogg and Post, gave their names to the companies they founded. Two other 
companies, General Mills and Ralston-Purina, were also able to get important market shares in this 
industry. These four companies were rivals throughout the 20
th
 century. Large companies with strong 
benefits and brilliant futures, these four breakfast cereal companies had reasons to think they were 
competing in this market for an indefinite time. In this way they could act as if they were playing a game 
repeated an infinite number of times, an equilibrium of which corresponds to a monopolistic price policy. 
In real life there is a restriction to the Oral Tradition Theorem for games repeated an infinite 
number of times that has not been mentioned. Since 1890, a federal law in the United States forbade 
‘‘monopolizing, the intention of monopolizing and the conspiracy to monopolise’’ a market. Government 
agencies took it upon themselves to ensure compliance with this legislation in defence of competition. 
Normally, the government of the United States does not show that companies have monopolized a 
market. Instead, the government tries to show that companies have conspired to monopolise the market. 
The underlying behaviour of the Oral Tradition Theorem, which does not allude in any way to 
conspiracy, could hardly be considered a violation of laws in defence of competition. Nevertheless, 
companies with wide temporal horizons move along the thin line which separates legal from illegal 
practices. 
Suppose the main companies in an industry reach the solution of an infinitely repeated game which 
grants monopolistic benefits. Each time one of the economic parameters changes, such as costs or 
consumer preference, the equilibriums of the game repeated a certain number of times also change. 
Companies need some mechanisms to pass from the equilibrium where they are to the new one. If this 
mechanism fails, they may end up at the equilibrium of the basic game with reduced benefits for 
everyone. The solution for this problem, which happened in the breakfast cereal industry, was called 
price leadership. Under price leadership, a company, the price leader, takes charge of the industry's price 
policy. Each time there is a change in one of the economic parameters, a change in the price policy is 
required; the price leader carries it out. The members of the industry depend on the price leader to adapt 
to the correct prices, so that the industry reaps the highest possible benefits. 
Throughout most of the 20
th
 century, the price leader in the breakfast cereal industry was Kellogg's, 
which was also number one in market share with over 40% of total sales. Considering inflation in the 
United States, particularly after World War II, most of price changes were upwards. From 1950 to 1972, 
99% of all price changes were price increases. A large proportion of all price increases, 80% between 
1965 and 1970, were led by Kellogg's. Normally the other companies in the sector followed this leader 
quickly. Even when other companies did not follow the lead, Kellogg's would not go back on its price 
increases policy. Instead, they spent more on advertising and waited for the rest of the industry to adjust 
to the new price. 
The price leader helped the breakfast cereal sector enjoy very high benefit margins, well above the 
average rates of the benefits of their assets. A government agency, always on the lookout for signs of a 
conspiracy, filed a law suit against the breakfast cereal companies. Admitting that they did not have 
proof of an evil conspiracy, the agency argued that through their behaviour, the breakfast cereal 
companies had in practice a shared monopoly and, should therefore submit to the agency's dictates. The 
idea the agency had of a shared monopoly, if it was correct, confirmed the idea that the companies in this 
sector, in following the price leader, had effectively achieved and maintained the solution of the 
maximum benefits of their repeated game. 
   
This situation dragged on for several years with all kinds of legal manoeuvres regarding who 
should be the judge in the case. The case was also greatly politicized. During the 1980 presidential 
campaign, Ronald Reagan wrote to Kellogg's expressing his concern with that situation. At the same 
time, labour organizations, fearing job losses, pressured President Carter strongly not to press Kellogg's. 
The agency realized that even if it could prove the existence of a shared monopoly, the case would not 
win in the courts. The judge in the case against the breakfast cereal companies closed it in 1981. 
Kellogg's and its price followers went on enjoying impressive benefits. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Most strategic games consist of repeated interactions between players. In this type of games, the 
first step is to recognize the possibility of cooperating. Games which are repeated have payoffs which 
‘‘generate’’ tensions between players who want to compete and cooperate. In repeated games, players 
interact repeated which may condition current behaviour based on past behaviour. This allows each 
player to be punished and rewarded, and in the end it allows players to achieve higher payoffs, including 
escaping from the prisoner's dilemma. If the ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ is only played once, the tension may 
produce a competitive payoff. Players may then want to cooperate so as to achieve a higher collective 
payoff, but the temptation to compete is irresistible. Nevertheless, as we have seen, when this game is 
played repeatedly, cooperation is reinforced meaning players achieve higher payoffs. In a game where 
players are patient enough, a trigger strategy may be used to reinforce cooperation. However, it may take 
some time until the players reach a tacit agreement on how to collaborate. This agreement can be reached 
as soon as they realize that they are all strategic players with immediate unattainable goals, since in order 
to achieve these goals they must sacrifice something. One must also consider that cooperation allows 
higher payoffs to be reached and avoiding it brings punishement. 
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